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HEARING SUMMARY
13th September 1999 Oral hearings continued this week in Bristol with evidence from Sir Donald Irvine, President, General Medical Council (GMC). Sir Donald was answering questions relating to the national scene (Block Two) by explaining the role and responsibility of the GMC for monitoring the medical profession in the UK. He focussed on the evolution of guidance given to doctors from the early 1980s through various editions of GMC publications "The Blue Book", "Good Medical Practice" (1995 and 1998) and "Maintaining Good Medical Practice" (1998). He described the GMCs response to complaints about doctors and how these are taken forward and the sanctions which the Council can impose. He discussed several specific guidelines relating to audit, disparagement of medical colleagues and informing the Council about colleagues performance. He then outlined the process of appeal to the Privy Council following a GMC Professional Conduct Committee decision and concluded by discussing the issue of self-regulation and re-validation.
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FULL TRANSCRIPT
1 Day 48, 13th September 1999 2 (11.00 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, everyone. Good morning, 4 Mr Langstaff. 5 OPENING STATEMENT BY MR LANGSTAFF 6 MR LANGSTAFF: Good morning, sir. Sir, it is regrettable 7 that we should have started the week in the way that we 8 have by being half an hour late in beginning, and I hope 9 I shall be borne out in the event by saying it is not 10 the way we mean to continue the rest of the week. 11 An explanation is due. There are two of them. 12 One is that it emerged in the course of the discussions 13 which we as Counsel to the Inquiry make ourselves 14 available for, with witnesses and their representatives, 15 that Sir Donald Irvine had the handicap of not having 16 a numbered, referenced bundle of the very considerable 17 documentation which we had, and that then had to be 18 photocopied. Those seeing the size of the files behind 19 me will recognise that that was not a quick task, 20 particularly since he then had to be given the 21 opportunity of knowing which document came at which 22 page. 23 Secondly, and this involves a slightly greater 24 degree of explanation, I have had again, in accordance 25 with our procedure, which is for any interested 0001 1 participant to ask questions through to us as Counsel to 2 the Inquiry, a number of questions which have been 3 delivered very late in the day, of some length, and it 4 is right that I should say something about them. 5 First of all, however late questions come, we are 6 very grateful that they should come. That is the first 7 point, and so nothing that I say hereafter should 8 discourage anyone from giving me those questions. But 9 the nature of some of the questions which I have had 10 from interested participants on what one might describe 11 as both sides of a debate, indicate something of 12 a misconception, I think, about the evidence which we 13 are entitled to ask Sir Donald about today. I think it 14 would be most unfortunate if there were to be any 15 misunderstanding or, indeed, if people should feel that 16 in this respect the Inquiry had failed them. 17 The law constrains us as to what we are entitled 18 to ask Sir Donald Irvine about. We will not, 19 therefore -- I will give the main reasons for it in 20 a moment -- ask him about why it was that the GMC 21 reached the decision it did in respect of Doctors 22 Wisheart, Dhasmana and Roylance. Nor shall we ask him 23 about the intimate discussions and considerations of the 24 Panel which sat in deliberation at the GMC. 25 There are number of reasons for this. The 0002 1 principal ones are these: first of all, this Inquiry is 2 a different Inquiry from that conducted by the GMC. It 3 is not relevant to this Inquiry to know why it was that 4 the GMC reached its decision because this Inquiry has to 5 reach a decision of its own, whatever that decision may 6 be. 7 The decision it has to reach is on a different 8 question and for a very different purpose. Our terms of 9 reference are to enquire into the management of care at 10 Bristol, which is a much more wide-ranging question 11 involving more than specific charges against three 12 individual clinicians, and in respect of a much wider 13 time-frame. It is of no more assistance to this panel 14 to know how another body decided in respect of part of 15 the picture than it would be, for instance, for a court 16 to consider the finding of an inquest into how somebody 17 met his or her death. It has long been established in 18 law that the decision of the one body, though entitled 19 to respect and established by law for a particular 20 public purpose, is actually of no relevance to the 21 ultimate decision that the court in that context has to 22 make. 23 Secondly, we are limited by our terms of reference 24 to looking at matters which relate to the management of 25 care between 1984 and 1995. The GMC's procedures and 0003 1 determination were outside that time-frame. So even if 2 my first reason was not valid, we are not permitted by 3 law to enquire into anything that happens after 1995. 4 The only exception to that is that we may, of course, 5 look at events since 1995 if they cast a particular 6 light and help us to know what was happening between 7 1984 and 1995, but otherwise, it is not part of our 8 Inquiry so we are constrained. 9 Thirdly, this Inquiry is not a Court of Appeal 10 from the GMC. There is, as a number of people have 11 asked me questions recognise, a route of appeal to the 12 Privy Council. In the case of one of the doctors 13 concerned, that route of appeal has been taken with 14 results which I will then make public knowledge. We 15 therefore have no function. We would be trespassing on 16 the function of others if we were to conduct what was in 17 the nature of an appeal against the decision of the GMC, 18 but more than that, are actually constrained by a ruling 19 of the Privy Council that the deliberations of the 20 Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical 21 Council are immune from exploration, and it is 22 a contempt contrary therefore to law to enquire into it. 23 So the law prevents me from asking questions which 24 might otherwise appear to be entirely natural to be 25 asked. 0004 1 I think, sir, all that it remains for me to say is 2 that none of what I have said is any fetter at all upon 3 you and the Panel reaching a decision of your own, as 4 you are not only entitled but bound to do, upon the 5 totality of the evidence which, as I have indicated, is 6 wider, lengthier and covers a greater time-scale and 7 a great number of operations than did the evidence which 8 we know was called before the General Medical Council. 9 Sir, I hope that is helpful. I hope that it is 10 not too disappointing to those who had seen our purpose 11 in part in a different light, and I shall be happy if 12 anyone wishes further explanation to make myself 13 available, as will, I know, my co-counsel and solicitor 14 to the Inquiry, should anyone wish further clarification 15 about what I have just said. But I think it is 16 important that should be on the record at the outset. 17 Sir, with that introduction, may I ask Sir Donald 18 Irvine to take the stand, please? 19 Sir Donald, it is our practice to stand to take 20 the oath. 21 SIR DONALD IRVINE (SWORN): 22 Examined by MR LANGSTAFF: 23 Q. Sir Donald, you are Donald Hamilton Irvine, are you? 24 A. I am. 25 Q. You are the current President of the General Medical 0005 1 Council? 2 A. I am. 3 Q. Having first been elected to that post in 1995 and 4 re-elected in May of this year? 5 A. That is so. 6 Q. Can we have on the screen, please, WIT 51/1? Is that 7 the start of a statement which you prepared for the 8 purposes of this Inquiry, addressing the questions you 9 were asked to address? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Can we have please on the screen page 51/14? 12 Is that, at the foot of the page, your signature? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. That is where the statement ends. Are its contents true 15 and accurate? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. You refer in the statement to an earlier statement 18 provided by Mr Finlay McMillan Scott, who I think is 19 present today. Can we have that, please, WIT 62/1? 20 That is the statement to which you refer, is it? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. We see at 62/27, that he signs that and signed that on 23 4th March of this year, and am I right in thinking that 24 you accept and, in so far as it is necessary to do so, 25 adopt what he says in his statement about as it were the 0006 1 "nuts and bolts" of the GMC? 2 A. I do. I believe there has been an addendum as well. 3 Q. Yes. The second statement he makes is 62/713 and that 4 finishes at 62/717, dated 2nd September 1999, signed by 5 Finlay Scott. Does what I said about his first 6 statement apply to his second? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Would I be right in giving the date of that as 9 2nd September and your own statement as the 3rd, that 10 that second statement was made after discussion with you 11 and perhaps to an extent in conjunction with you? 12 A. It was. 13 Q. Before I ask you questions, I understand that you want 14 to make a brief statement? 15 A. Thank you. 16 STATEMENT BY SIR DONALD IRVINE 17 SIR DONALD IRVINE: I am grateful to you for your opening 18 remarks, which, in some senses, anticipate what I wanted 19 to say. 20 I am sure that the Panel and you, sir, will 21 appreciate that I am precluded absolutely from speaking 22 as to what occurred in the course of the Professional 23 Conduct Committee in camera deliberations, and you have 24 indicated so. I am also concerned that certain lines of 25 questioning could lead people to draw the inference that 0007 1 the views I express here must be the views that 2 I expressed in camera whilst I was acting as the 3 Chairman of the Professional Conduct Committee engaged 4 in the Inquiry into the Bristol doctors. 5 I am sure you will understand my position, 6 Chairman, and it would be quite wrong for anyone to be 7 able to say as a result of what I say here that it is 8 clear which way I voted on any particular aspect. You 9 are no doubt conscious of the Privy Council judgment 10 relating to the disclosure of the in camera 11 deliberations. I hope therefore, Mr Langstaff, I will 12 not be asked any questions which could take us down 13 those avenues. If I feel or I perceive I am being asked 14 along those lines, whilst I certainly want to be as 15 helpful as I possibly can to the Inquiry, I may have to 16 say that I cannot answer for legal reasons. 17 That is all I wish to say. 18 Q. Sir Donald, we will see how the questioning goes. 19 A. Indeed. 20 Q. If you and I come to a disagreement about the question, 21 it will have to be resolved as and when it happens. 22 A. Indeed. 23 Q. At the bottom of WIT 51/1 there is a motto "Protecting 24 patients, guiding doctors." 25 For how long has that been the motto of the GMC? 0008 1 A. I think since 1995. I am open to correction on that. 2 It is certainly later than 1995. 3 Q. So the "protecting patients, guiding doctors", would 4 appear to put patients first? 5 A. It was a carefully considered decision to attempt to 6 make clear where the priorities of the GMC lay. It has 7 dual responsibilities both for doctors and to patients, 8 and we wish, since there has clearly been ambiguity 9 about where the priority might lay, that it lay actually 10 with protecting patients. So it was in a sense an 11 explicit statement to that effect, to help us and others 12 concentrate our minds on that. 13 Q. So it was seen, was it, in 1995, that there was 14 ambiguity about whether the GMC put patients' interests 15 first? 16 A. There was a widespread perception of such ambiguity, 17 both outside and at times inside the Council, and it 18 seemed prudent to clarify. 19 Q. Is what you are saying that there was a degree of 20 movement towards adopting the motto, a development over 21 the years in any event from 1984 to 1985, towards the 22 privacy of the patient? 23 A. Yes. I think you put it well in your question, in 24 indicating change over a period of time. I of course 25 have been a member of the Council during the time at 0009 1 which that change has been happening. By the time we 2 came to 1995, it had moved to the point where we very 3 much wished to make that absolutely explicit. 4 Q. The GMC had been -- has been, I think in a number of 5 quarters -- criticised in relation to at any rate the 6 period before 1995, for appearing rather to protect 7 doctors than to protect patients. 8 To what extent, looked at now, do you consider 9 that there was validity in those criticisms? 10 A. I think that some of the criticisms stem from 11 a misunderstanding or lack of understanding or 12 appreciation of precisely what the functions of the GMC 13 are, and the framework within which it works, what it 14 can and cannot do. 15 Perhaps I ought to say very briefly here, to 16 provide that context that will inform the whole of my 17 evidence, the GMC is governed by statute, by Act of 18 Parliament, the 1983 Act is the defining Act, and what 19 it does has to be done within that framework. The 20 principal functions are to keep a register of doctors 21 who are competent to practise in this country, to 22 exercise some oversight of the basic medical education 23 of doctors making students into doctors through the 24 function of inspecting final qualifying examinations and 25 our medical schools and our rather more diffuse function 0010 1 of co-ordinating all stages of medical education. 2 The third function is to give advice to the 3 profession on matters of standards and medical ethics 4 from time to time, and as required. 5 Fourthly, to operate the fitness to practise 6 procedures by which, on complaint, we enquire into 7 a doctor's practice where a doctor's registration may be 8 called into question. As you know, there are three 9 limbs to that part of the framework dealing with the 10 conduct of doctors, with the doctors who may be impaired 11 by ill-health and those now who may be impaired by 12 performance. 13 That framework, then, we have to strictly adhere 14 to. It gives us powers to act decisively in some areas, 15 but it places considerable constraints particularly at 16 the operational level where the Council's 17 responsibilities do not run. 18 Q. Can I put perhaps some flesh on that? You have made 19 I think a point in a number of articles and in a number 20 of statements about the importance to the profession of 21 audit? 22 A. Of audit, yes. 23 Q. You see the audit cycle, as I understand it, being 24 a question of promulgating standards; of measuring what 25 has been done, and then how far those measurements 0011 1 indicate that the standards have been achieved, with 2 a view if necessary to changing performance in the light 3 of the results? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. In so far as the GMC is concerned, if one, as it were, 6 were to look at an audit of its procedures and practices 7 over the period that we were concerned with, I wonder if 8 you can help me with some as it were basic statistics? 9 In so far as competence is concerned, how many 10 doctors' names were, during the period 1984 to 1995, 11 erased from the register on the grounds of incompetent 12 performance of their duties? 13 A. Doctors during that period were erased on grounds of 14 misconduct in a clinical area. I think I indicated that 15 the proportion has risen over the years. I do not have 16 the precise numbers, but of course I will supply those 17 to you. 18 Q. So misconduct aside, the poor performer has never, 19 between 1984 and 1995, been erased from the register on 20 the grounds of poor performance alone? 21 A. A number of doctors have been erased from the register 22 where their performance has been so unsatisfactory as to 23 constitute serious professional misconduct in the GMC's 24 eyes. But of course you touch on a fundamental weakness 25 in the fitness to practise procedures, which we 0012 1 recognised in that period and set about a strengthening 2 of the procedures by having the Medical Performance Act. 3 It gave us the power to look at a doctor's pattern 4 of practice over a period of time, but the basic fact of 5 the matter is that we became aware that where a doctor's 6 practice was manifestly unsatisfactory, it was 7 nevertheless very difficult to bring a charge of serious 8 professional misconduct and make it stick. This left 9 the public exposed. 10 So from here, there followed the whole of the 11 development of the performance procedures, the statute 12 was enacted in 1995 and those procedures are now 13 operational. 14 Q. So before the performance procedures, am I right or 15 wrong in thinking that no doctor was struck off, erased 16 from the register, on the grounds of poor or inadequate 17 performance measured over a period of time in his 18 practice? 19 A. You are using the word "performance" in the very 20 technical sense we now do, but putting it plainly, if 21 you are saying were doctors struck off for making very 22 bad clinical mistakes, of course they were. 23 Q. So far as the complaints were concerned, roughly how 24 many complaints a year between 1984 and 1995 came to the 25 GMC for assessment by an assessor? 0013 1 A. The numbers, again, I will give you these precisely, but 2 the numbers have risen steadily during the period. 3 Towards the end of the period we were talking about 4 1,500 or so complaints, as against the 3,000 complaints, 5 for instance, which we have roughly now. There has been 6 a steady increase. We have that documented and we will 7 supply you with that information. 8 Q. Of the complaints made, what percentage, roughly, were 9 rejected at the scrutiny stage? 10 A. In a recent audit, we established that just under 20 per 11 cent of complaints were not really in a form that could 12 be translated into a complaint upon which we could act 13 or even enquire. For example, since we are concerned 14 with specific doctors, there would be no named doctor or 15 the matter would be about institutional questions which 16 were not within our terms of reference. 17 Beyond that fifth, roughly 100 cases a year 18 reached the Professional Conduct Committee, but I will 19 give you the precise figures so there is no ambiguity. 20 Q. So one is looking broadly speaking by the end of the 21 period, you say there were 1,500 complaints, of which 22 roughly 100 would get through the Professional Conduct 23 Committee and that would be in the region of about 24 6 per cent. Had the portion varied much in the years 25 1984 to 1995? 0014 1 A. Can you clarify? Do you mean the proportion of cases 2 which had a clinical content? 3 Q. The portion of complaints reaching the PCC, was it 4 always about 6 per cent, roughly? 5 A. Roughly, to the best of my knowledge. 6 Q. So far as the GMC is today constituted, how many 7 complaints roughly per year presently come before the 8 Professional Conduct Committee? 9 A. The proportion is rising but at the present time, it is 10 roughly the same. But of course this is now a distorted 11 picture because the performance procedures are in 12 operation and beginning to affect the picture. That is 13 to say, more cases are being considered where there 14 appears to be a question about a doctor's registration 15 than formerly. I have given you some numbers to 16 indicate roughly how that element is increasing. 17 In addition to this, to complete the picture, we 18 must not forget there are other doctors who come into 19 the health procedures where equally there is a question 20 about their registration. 21 Q. So in terms of overall numbers coming for a hearing 22 before the Professional Conduct Committee, roughly how 23 many do you expect in a chronological year now? 24 A. Roughly 100. 25 Q. And how many extra would you add to that for those cases 0015 1 coming before the Committee on Professional Practice? 2 A. In the year in which this has been operating, there have 3 been three, but this is utterly misleading. There are 4 75 cases in the pipeline. 5 We had anticipated that there would be more. We 6 planned our procedures on the basis that there would be 7 more, but of course as you will know, the legislation 8 was not retrospective; a pattern has to be established 9 in order to trigger a complaint. 10 My understanding is that that in part at least 11 accounts for the fact that the build-up has been 12 relatively slow. 13 Q. So a total, one anticipates for next year, if one puts 14 conduct and practice into one pot, of 175 cases. What 15 about the ill-health? 16 A. The proportion has remained roughly the same. We had 17 about 800 doctors in or around the health procedures. 18 You know that some are supervised by our health 19 screeners, and others are where there is a dispute by 20 the doctor as to whether -- basically whether they are 21 willing to accept conditions put upon them when they go 22 before the Health Committee. 23 But what I will do, I will be able to give you 24 precise answers to this question too, and indeed during 25 the course of the hearing today, we will bring that 0016 1 information to you. 2 Q. I am grateful. Can you indicate how many health cases 3 actually come for a hearing before the Health Committee? 4 A. It is a small proportion. I cannot tell you the exact 5 proportion, but I will give you that. It is a smaller 6 proportion of the whole. Most doctors under the health 7 procedures accept the need for supervision and enter 8 into that agreement. 9 Q. So are we looking in terms of actual hearings putting 10 together the present position in respect of conduct, 11 practice and health, at a figure anticipated for next 12 year of round about 200 hearings? 13 A. Possibly more. 14 Q. By much, or is that broadly the range? 15 A. I cannot answer that accurately. I simply do not know 16 what the pattern of increase in performance is going to 17 be. Our original estimates based upon assessments we 18 made about possible problem areas in practice suggested 19 that it would be much higher. We are still basing our 20 plans on that assumption. 21 Q. If one takes a figure, then, of 200 to 300, allowing for 22 a 50 per cent increase in the numbers, that would be, 23 today, looking at the period 1984 to 1995, roughly how 24 many hearings, all told, in terms of conduct and health, 25 were there on average per year? It has to be a broad 0017 1 figure; it is just a feel for it that I am after. 2 A. Again, I prefer to give you the exact figures later in 3 the morning, but if I tell you that the hearings of the 4 Professional Conduct Committee have gone from relatively 5 infrequently, certainly as the Council began, through in 6 the last ten years to regular hearings. If you were 7 a doctor on the Conduct Committee, you expected to set 8 aside three to four weeks for these hearings, to 9 a position today where we are in virtually continuous 10 session and we are making arrangements now, given the 11 rising number of references from our preliminary 12 proceedings to arrangements to run panels of the Conduct 13 Committee in parallel. It is a huge increase. And of 14 course, added to that is the fact that the complexity of 15 the cases has also added to length. 16 Q. If one were to ask what the number of registered doctors 17 was -- and obviously exact figures again will be 18 available -- from 1984 to 1995, what ball-park figure is 19 there likely to be? 20 A. Of the total doctors on the Medical Register, the 21 ball-park would be around 180,000. But of those, around 22 100,000 practise in the National Health Service. Many 23 of our registrants are overseas or retired. The 24 operating figure for this country is effectively 25 100,000. 0018 1 Q. So if, for the sake of example, let us suppose in the 2 1980s there was an average of 100 hearings per year, 3 that would be approximately one-tenth of 1 per cent of 4 the total number of registered doctors in the country? 5 A. It is a very small proportion. It is not a reflection 6 of, of course, complaints made against doctors. The 7 purpose of our hearings is to enquire into circumstances 8 where a doctor's registration may be called into 9 question. Hence the phrase "serious professional 10 misconduct". 11 Q. If one were, therefore, to get a feel for the system, 12 bearing in mind what you have just said, does the 13 proportion, do you think, represent an absence of proper 14 complaint about doctors and their practice on the one 15 hand, does it represent the possibility that doctors, 16 all bar a tiny percentage, probably faithfully all 17 discharge their professional obligations, or does it, 18 would you say, indicate something of a shortcoming in 19 the procedures because they are too restrictively drawn, 20 or a mixture of those factors? 21 A. I think it may be fairly said as a mixture of those 22 factors, but an important part of context in this has to 23 be the number of complaints which are brought against 24 doctors working in the National Health Service. The 25 majority of doctors registered in this country do work 0019 1 in the National Health Service. So patients, for 2 instance, who wish to complain about a general 3 practitioner, their family doctor, are more likely in 4 the first instance to go to the appropriate Health 5 Authority, and those complaints are dealt with there. 6 There may be an onward reference in some 7 instances, but many of these cases are dealt with 8 exclusively in the Health Service and there are 9 comparable arrangements within the hospital field. 10 So it would be misleading in the extreme to think 11 that the only source of both complaint and an indication 12 of the volume of complaint were the GMC procedures. One 13 has to look at the wider picture as to how the public 14 sees these things and where they go. 15 Q. Taking away, as it were, your GMC hat for a moment, if 16 one were to look at the system of regulation as a system 17 involving the GMC, the employer, that is the National 18 Health Service or the Trust as may be the case, and the 19 other regulatory body such as the Ombudsman, the court 20 system and so on, would you describe the period from 21 1984 to 1995, at any rate, as one in which the system 22 was co-ordinated in any way between those regulatory 23 bodies? 24 A. Co-ordinated up to a point, but I have expressed my 25 opinion about this in public before. I do not believe 0020 1 the system was as well co-ordinated as it might have 2 been, or should be. 3 Q. Can I pick up on the two elements in which you criticise 4 the system as it was from 1984 to 1995, or may criticise 5 it. One of those is the co-ordination or lack of 6 co-ordination which you mentioned in response to my 7 question, and the second is your acceptance that part of 8 the picture for the absence of complaint may have been 9 the fact that the complaints procedures were too 10 restrictive. 11 Can I ask you about that latter first? Again, in 12 general terms, dealing with the period 1984 to 1995, 13 what about the disciplinary procedures that the GMC had 14 that was too restrictive in respect of what one might 15 loosely describe as the available pool of complaint? 16 A. I think there has been undoubtedly a perception that 17 they may be too restrictive, and that has been revealed, 18 manifest, in comments, for instance, about the level of 19 the threshold at which complaints may be taken forward 20 and hearings and action triggered. That is absolutely 21 true. 22 That has found expression, I think for instance, 23 of Mr Nigel Spearing and his Private Members Bill, in 24 the early 1980s, I cannot remember exactly; we can check 25 that. But his Bill and his solution was to try and open 0021 1 up the procedures to make the conduct -- I think he 2 sought a serious conduct rather than -- a conduct rather 3 than serious professional misconduct to lower the 4 threshold. 5 So that sort of debate has certainly been alive 6 inside the profession, and publicly. 7 Q. So one way in which the procedures may, you think, have 8 been too restrictive was because of the use of the word 9 "serious" in front of the words "professional 10 misconduct"? 11 A. Yes, that is one reason, but I think I have also 12 mentioned in my evidence that from a patient's point of 13 view, there is a greater difficulty. Most patients do 14 not start asking themselves with a complaint "Is this 15 likely to be serious professional misconduct or not?", 16 they want to know what to do and where to go and have 17 the thing taken forward. I think for many patients, 18 then, a difficulty has been knowing how to get started, 19 who is responsible for what, and we are back to this 20 question of co-ordination. 21 We feel really quite strongly about that, and in 22 fact that is a matter which I have raised with the 23 Secretary of State quite recently, that that needs to be 24 pursued and we are pursuing it. It is almost as though, 25 two systems running in parallel, it was possible for 0022 1 people to fall through the middle, and that is eminently 2 not satisfactory. 3 So, addressing that problem in the period to which 4 you refer is, I think -- I speak personally -- a matter 5 of urgency, and it requires the co-operation of all 6 concerned. How do we make it as simple as possible and 7 as easy as possible for people to take a proper 8 complaint forward? 9 Q. We will come to the question of transparency or ease of 10 access to a complaints procedure in a moment or two, but 11 looking back at the restrictive influences in the past, 12 one is the use of the word "serious". The standard of 13 proof which the GMC adopted between 1984 and 1995, and 14 I think still does, is "beyond reasonable doubt", is it 15 not? 16 A. That is correct. 17 Q. If the object is to protect patients, one would wish to 18 eliminate any unnecessary risk to a patient, would one 19 not? 20 A. I agree. 21 Q. The existence of an unnecessary risk is, by definition, 22 something which should be avoided? 23 A. Of course. 24 Q. How does one properly protect patients if the risk has 25 to be not so much a serious risk but a risk of seriously 0023 1 deficient practice or conduct? Can one properly do it? 2 A. No, and if one were to pursue this line of argument, one 3 would run into a blind end. It is for precisely this 4 reason that we have undertaken some very radical 5 thinking indeed about how to address the problem, 6 because you have talked about prevention; you simply 7 cannot get at a preventative strategy if one relies on 8 a complaints-driven system alone. It leaves far too 9 many questions asked about practice which is, I know, of 10 concern to members of the public which would fall into 11 a kind of grey area of not very good practice, but 12 perhaps not bad enough to remove a doctor altogether 13 from the medical register or for an employer to 14 discharge the doctor. I know that this causes great 15 concern to people. 16 So we have to find a better way, and you only do 17 that by exploring a completely different avenue. 18 If one can therefore say, in order to ensure that 19 the Medical Register means what it says, doctors, men 20 and women on the Medical Register, are today when the 21 patient goes to see the doctor in the surgery or at the 22 hospital, as up to date and fit as possible. One needs 23 to think of the kind of mechanisms whereby that would be 24 achieved, both managerial and professional. 25 If one starts from that end then, where the 0024 1 complaints procedures fit acquires an altogether 2 different significance and the question of the threshold 3 acquires a different significance as well. 4 I should just add lastly, that of course in terms 5 of the seriousness of a doctor appearing before any 6 fitness to practise committee of the GMC, the 7 consequences for the doctor are serious indeed. They 8 are about loss of everything in the ultimate. That of 9 course is where the standard of proof has continued to 10 rest and why. 11 So I am merely saying, we came to the conclusion 12 in the early 1990s -- this has been an unfolding 13 development, a fundamental development since then, that 14 reliance on fitness to practise, complaints alone, would 15 not give the kind of protection that people expect. 16 Q. So what you are describing is a system of 17 after-the-event punishment, the GMC being the punitive 18 arm of the profession historically, rather than a body 19 which thus far has, by its presence in procedures, 20 prevented the practice of inadequate medicine? 21 A. Yes. I think what the GMC has been able to do by its 22 statutory power is to be able to give advice, and it has 23 done that in an increasingly cogent way. A fundamental 24 change to that was developed in the 1990s and culminated 25 in the adoption of explicit values and standards as 0025 1 distinct from implicit standards and values, set out in 2 Good Medical Practice. But it is not empowered to 3 exercise a day-to-day monitoring of doctors at work. 4 That responsibility has always fallen to the employers. 5 I think I have drawn attention elsewhere too, to 6 the fact that in the system of medical regulation, as 7 distinct from professional self-regulation, which is one 8 part of it, we have become increasingly aware of the 9 extent to which, then, these local arrangements are 10 fundamental, both to assuring good practice, preventing 11 things going wrong, and when things do appear to be 12 going wrong, being able to act promptly and effectively 13 before harm is done, either to patients or indeed the 14 doctor. I have set out that sort of argument in the 15 first of the two annex papers, the British Medical 16 Journal. I base that kind of analysis on the very 17 excellent work of people like Professor Marilyn 18 Rosenthal, who have made studies of how medical practice 19 has regulated where doctors work. It is a fundamental 20 change in thinking. 21 Q. Marilyn Rosenthal, in one of her writings, 1987 -- I am 22 not sure if we yet have this scanned in. It is being 23 scanned in at the moment. I will have to come back to 24 that, I am sorry. 25 So far as standards then were concerned during 0026 1 1984 to 1995, standards of good practice, we have heard 2 from the evidence given to us by the Royal Colleges that 3 they would promulgate the standards in their own 4 particular specialisms. Much of the evidence that we 5 have heard suggests that there was a vacuum when it came 6 to the enforcement of those standards. Is that how you 7 would have seen the years 1984 to 1995, or not? 8 A. The enforcement by the Royal Colleges, do you mean? 9 Q. Enforcement generally. 10 A. In general terms, yes. 11 Q. So far as local level enforcement is concerned, by 12 a Trust or by NHS management before Trusts were 13 inaugurated, the problem that we have heard evidence of 14 is that when a complaint would be made about the quality 15 of practice or the conduct of a given clinician in 16 a hospital, it would be left essentially as a matter of 17 medical opinion and medical advice and medical 18 regulation, either through the "three wise men" 19 procedure, or if it went to management, that local 20 management would say, "This is not a management matter; 21 this is a medical matter so we have no right to do 22 anything about it without involving the doctors". This, 23 I think, is familiar territory to you, is it? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. We have heard it suggested, amongst others by 0027 1 Dr Halliday from the Department of Health, that in 2 looking to the doctors, the national management and 3 local management would ultimately look to the General 4 Medical Council. Is that the way that it worked? 5 A. I am not absolutely sure what he means by that. 6 I wonder if you could just explain further? If in every 7 instance of a complaint one would look to the General 8 Medical Council; is that the suggestion? 9 Q. What he said was the Secretary of State was not 10 responsible for the way that medicine was practised -- 11 this is Day 13, page 79, line 7, for reference 12 purposes. He said that was for the General Medical 13 Council, so he placed the responsibility for the way in 14 which medicine was practised upon the General Medical 15 Council. 16 From what you are saying, I think you would say 17 "That is asking too much of us, because we were the 18 long-stop"? 19 A. What I am saying is that, we have to operate within our 20 framework. 21 Q. Absolutely. 22 A. Our framework did not include the management of doctors 23 at work. The relevant framework is giving advice on 24 standards of practice and promulgating those standards, 25 seeking to inform the culture of practice, particularly 0028 1 through the education system and that part which we are 2 specifically responsible for, and acting on the basis of 3 complaint when things appear to have gone wrong. 4 Q. At the hospital, the local management level, was it 5 a consequence of clinical freedom that the local 6 manager, if he was a manager and not himself 7 a clinician, or herself a clinician, would have to take 8 medical advice as to whether or not the standards were 9 improper, inappropriate, and so on? 10 A. One would expect so. 11 Q. So inevitably, whether at a local level or at a national 12 level, the profession was self-regulating? 13 A. Unquestionably the profession, and doctors, had very, 14 very considerable influence on what constitutes or does 15 not constitute appropriate practice. That is absolutely 16 true. I mean, that is the basis, whatever the 17 regulatory framework, it starts from the question of 18 being able to recognise good practice and serious 19 departures from it. As the complexity of medicine has 20 increased, so that task has become more and more 21 difficult and one is dependent more and more on the 22 expertise of people who actually know that. 23 Q. In terms of the procedures available at local level, if 24 a consultant were involved, that would be circumscribed 25 by documents such as HC 99? 0029 1 A. The NHS has a statutory framework, that is correct. 2 Q. Which it might be said was slow and cumbersome in 3 reaching any resolution of what might be a difficult 4 problem? 5 A. I have no personal knowledge, in particular with my 6 background in general practice, of the operation of this 7 system in detail. I can only say from general 8 impression that there was considerable variation in how 9 that might be applied and how people approached the 10 problems. 11 Q. So it would depend, really, in the nature of local 12 management, would it? 13 A. In the nature of local people, including local 14 management. 15 MR LANGSTAFF: Sir, I am very much in your hands, Chairman, 16 as to when you would wish to take a short break in the 17 morning, bearing in mind that it will probably be 18 sensible to have a lunch break some time no later than 19 a quarter past 1. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: I had briefly given my mind to this and 21 wondered whether I might propose the following, 22 I believe it is now in your possession in the form of 23 a small yellow slip, that we continue until 12.30 and 24 then take a break at around a conventional lunchtime, 25 for 45 minutes, and then go on through the afternoon as 0030 1 I have indicated with our normal quarter of an hour 2 break halfway through the afternoon. Would that be 3 satisfactory first of all to the witness, and then to 4 those who are with you and behind you? Would that be 5 satisfactory to everyone? 6 SIR DONALD IRVINE: Yes, thank you. 7 MR LANGSTAFF: Sir, if I can just announce the prospective 8 timings: that we finish this session at 12.30, have 9 a break until 1.15, and then have a session from 1.15 10 until 2.30, and then see where we are. 11 I was exploring with you the nature of the way in 12 which inadequate practice might be regulated by the one 13 branch or other of the regulatory bodies, taking as 14 a given that the GMC is really the end of the road, the 15 long-stop. I have it right, have I? That is 16 essentially how the GMC sees itself? 17 A. Yes, although I qualify that: within the statutory 18 framework that I have described, we have been undergoing 19 a considerable change of outlook ourselves which began, 20 again, in the early 1990s, and that was effectively to 21 see how far within the framework, the statutory 22 framework as it was, we could be as effective as 23 possible. 24 That change of view was occasioned by our 25 understanding that couching advice to the profession in 0031 1 fairly negative terms, in terms of what doctors could 2 not or should not do, seemed to be unsatisfactory, that 3 there had to be a better way of doing this because one 4 effect of that policy was to leave doctors feeling that, 5 "Well, since I am clearly not bad, none of this advice 6 applies to me". 7 This recognition was coupled also with our 8 understanding that the culture of medicine needed to 9 take far greater account of patients, what patients 10 thought about doctoring, what they expected of their 11 doctors, and there seemed to be a gap, as it were, 12 a mismatch here between the public and its confidence in 13 the kind of advice given and the advice that we were 14 actually giving. 15 Thirdly, it was triggered by the issues of 16 advertising, which do not seem central to performance, 17 but nevertheless, the examination that we made at the 18 time and the questioning about doctors' advertising led 19 us in, I think it was 1991, really to put as central the 20 whole question, for instance of information to patients, 21 to discard much of the conventional thinking which was 22 restrictive, and it was that kind of way of thinking 23 which then encouraged us and led us to think that we 24 ought to address our remarks more positively and more 25 explicitly to the whole profession about their duties 0032 1 and responsibilities. 2 The last point -- it is very fundamental to the 3 notion of self-regulation, but that is not an end in 4 itself, only a means to getting the best care for the 5 patient -- was to make explicit that which had always 6 been implicit in medicine, and that there is a contract 7 between doctor and patient and that a registered 8 practitioner, in accepting the privileges of being 9 registered, which includes the ability to earn one's 10 livelihood as a doctor, enters into certain obligations 11 to the patient, to the public, as a result. 12 It is that kind of thinking, Mr Langstaff, which 13 was a million miles away from the very restrictive 14 interpretation that we had traditionally placed on 15 matters earlier. 16 It was in tune, lastly, with the more general move 17 in medicine towards being explicit about good standards 18 of practice wherever possible. The whole guidelines 19 movement as you know was developing at that time, and 20 I have given some background to that in Annex B to my 21 evidence. 22 Q. As you know, and as the wider audience will have 23 appreciated, your statement is to be taken as read, so 24 the questions I ask are supplemental to it, but in 25 essence the points which I think you would accept in 0033 1 respect of the way in which the GMC had a place in the 2 regulatory framework from 1984 to 1995 are these: that 3 first it was punitive rather than preventative; you have 4 already accepted that? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Secondly, it was -- it may be the same thing -- reactive 7 rather than proactive? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Thirdly, the standards that it promulgated were 10 standards which were negative rather than positive: 11 "thou shalt not", rather than "thou wilt"? 12 A. Yes, I qualify that only in the sense that particular 13 aspects of the standards were as apposite now as then, 14 and in fact many of them found their way into the 15 present guidance, so it is the presentation and 16 direction which changed. 17 Q. So far as the "thou wilt" part of it was concerned, 18 standards tended to be unspoken rather than prescribed 19 by the GMC, or for that matter by the Royal Colleges? 20 A. That was the position in medicine as a whole, both in 21 this country and elsewhere. Much of medicine, until the 22 late 1980s, was based on implicit standards, the 23 movement to explicit standards is relatively recent. 24 Q. With those particular features in mind, I want to ask 25 you about what information we can derive looking back 0034 1 historically from the way in which the guidance given by 2 the General Medical Council in its publications Good 3 Medical Practice, may shed light upon what actually was 4 the position from 1984 to 1995. 5 If I can ask you first to have on the screen 6 51/103, it is the very last page, page 18, I should say, 7 of the 1998 guidance. Paragraph 57: 8 "To have an absolute duty to conduct all research 9 with honesty and integrity." 10 Can you explain to me how an absolute duty differs 11 from a duty? 12 A. I think it is a matter of emphasis. 13 Q. When one looks to the earlier paragraphs of the booklet, 14 I think one does not find the word "absolute", one just 15 finds "duties". 16 Is it the case that the proactive duties which are 17 set out earlier in the booklet have the same force and 18 emphasis as does paragraph 57? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. So although the word "absolute" is there, it is a word 21 which might as well not have been there in terms of 22 making any difference of approach to one area rather 23 than the other? 24 A. You are quite right. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Just to clarify that point, could it be 0035 1 said -- I have no knowledge of this -- that the use of 2 the word "absolute" here is to suggest that there is no 3 discretion ever to depart from that duty whereas in 4 other cases there may be a discretion under certain 5 circumstances? Could that be a reason? I ask without 6 knowing the answer. 7 A. I do know that the issue of research misconduct has 8 exercised us a great deal, and we have been very 9 conscious of the need to promulgate as clear advice as 10 possible that research has to be conducted with honesty 11 and integrity, for the consequences of not doing so are 12 fundamental. And to get that message as clear as 13 possible, I think, lies behind this point. 14 Of course, it is reflected in the inference that 15 is drawn from these standards. It is known, for 16 instance, that if a case is brought and found proved, 17 the doctor may expect to be erased unless there are 18 remarkable reasons why not. 19 MR LANGSTAFF: Can we, with that in mind, look back at the 20 duties and entitlements which begin at page 95 on the 21 1995 Good Medical Practice. 22 What I would like those who are showing the screen 23 to do is to take the left-hand side of this page, move 24 it to the left and have a split screen with page 124 on 25 the left-hand side. 0036 1 On the left-hand side we have the 1995 statement; 2 on the right-hand side we have the 1998, so we can see 3 the development of the guide from 1995 to 1998. 4 In both, of course, we begin with the entitlement 5 to good standards of practice and care, and that has 6 always been the entitlement of patients, has it not? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. So this is making explicit that which would have been 9 implicit, was it? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Essential to good standards of practice and care are 12 said to be professional competence. That has always 13 been the case, has it? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Good relationships with patients and colleagues, and 16 observance of professional ethical obligations. 17 So any patient would have been expected at any 18 stage, even from 1984 and 1995, to professional 19 competence as an entitlement as part of the standard of 20 practice which a doctor professionally had to deliver to 21 him? 22 A. That has always been the case. 23 Q. Then a difference I want to ask you about, under how 24 "good clinical care" is described. 25 In 1995, you must take suitable and prompt action 0037 1 when necessary and this must include ...", and three 2 matters are noted. There is a change in the drafting. 3 In 1998 it is "good clinical care must include ..." and 4 "suitable prompt action" becomes the third of the 5 bullet points. 6 What is the reasoning behind the change of 7 drafting? 8 A. Simplification and economy of words, I think. There is 9 no significance attached to the question of suitable and 10 prompt action. I am conscious of the fact that I was 11 not a member of the Standards Committee when the 12 detailed work of drafting was done, but I am conscious 13 of the fact that they were seeking to build on the known 14 strengths of this guidance, which was its extreme 15 simplicity and directness. 16 Q. So this is purely presentation? 17 A. I am sure it is. 18 Q. Can we have another split screen? I want the right-hand 19 side of 195, please, and the right-hand side of 124. 20 Keeping up to date, paragraph 5: again there is 21 a difference in the drafting. You see on the right-hand 22 side in the 1998 version, "You must keep your knowledge 23 and skills up to date throughout your working life", 24 that is the duty, "in particular ..." 25 In 1995, on the left-hand side, "You must maintain 0038 1 the standard of your performance by keeping your 2 knowledge and skills up to date." 3 So one is looking at keeping skills and knowledge 4 up to date as an absolute duty, or a duty; the other is 5 looking to the maintenance of standard of performance, 6 as part of which the keeping of knowledge and skills up 7 to date is an expectation. 8 Again, are we looking at a drafting change, or is 9 this something that occurred in discussion as to the 10 change from one to the other? 11 A. I mean, the significance of the difference between these 12 two sessions is that there was a tightening of the 13 guidance. That was the intention. 14 Q. How do you see the tightening? 15 A. I think part of the 1998 one is not on the screen. 16 Q. We can have a look at it, certainly. 17 A. Can I just look first? I am looking at the 1998 18 guidance, the section, paragraphs 5 and 6 on keeping up 19 to date, but then there is a presentational change which 20 actually represented a change of emphasis and substance, 21 because it then goes on to a specific heading, 22 "Maintaining your performance". 23 Q. We can have that, if you will just give me one moment. 24 Can we take the right-hand side, please, of the screen 25 and replace it with page 96, the left-hand part? That 0039 1 is what you had in mind? 2 A. Yes, I mean, essentially the 1995 guidance has 3 a three-paragraph section called "Keeping up to date." 4 We did not think that that gave adequate focus on 5 the matter of the doctor's performance, so a new 6 section -- the thing was subdivided to heighten this. 7 There are also drafting changes as you will see in 8 paragraph 7 about audit. 9 Q. Yes. I was going to ask you about that, because that is 10 again a considerable change from what there was earlier. 11 A. That is correct. 12 Q. So between 1995 and 1998, the explicit statement, making 13 plain that which was implicit, was to give a greater 14 emphasis to the maintenance of performance and a greater 15 emphasis to the need as a professional obligation to 16 take part in regular and systematic medical and clinical 17 audit? 18 A. That is correct. 19 Q. Does it follow that, as from 1995 to 1998, there had 20 been a change towards where we are now, that in the 21 years leading up to 1995 there would have been a similar 22 trend? 23 A. Would you clarify that, please? 24 Q. Certainly. May I conclude that there has been an 25 increasing emphasis through the 1990s on maintaining 0040 1 performance? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. It is the corollary of that that if one were to take 4 a snapshot in 1992, one would have a lesser emphasis on 5 the maintenance of performance than one would in 1995? 6 A. It has been a continuously evolving process. 7 Q. If one goes back to the 1980s, one would have, it 8 follows, a lesser emphasis still? 9 A. Yes, that is correct. That is a reflection of the state 10 of development of clinical audit and clinical 11 standards. They are set in the wider context. 12 Q. It is part of my reason for taking you to 1995 and 1998 13 documents to see what they may show us of the trends 14 between 1995 and 1998 with a view to extrapolating to 15 the years before 1995 and asking whether those trends 16 are now merely continuing the trend that there was then 17 with the consequence that, then, there was less of an 18 emphasis than there may be now on certain aspects of the 19 obligations of a doctor. 20 You follow the purpose of the questioning? 21 A. I do. I think I ought to make a general point about the 22 guidance here. It is the policy of the GMC, 23 particularly in this form of guidance, to try to stick 24 as far as possible to matters of principle and of 25 fundamental importance. 0041 1 To that extent, there is a tendency not to include 2 in the guidance that which may be still of unproven 3 value or at a formative stage not yet received as 4 a fundamental part of practice. 5 We are constantly enjoined from all quarters to 6 elaborate on this guidance and to reflect some of those 7 developments and we resist this absolutely firmly 8 because the strength of it -- and we have discovered the 9 extent of the strength of it from the many users of it, 10 doctors, managers and patients -- lies in its very 11 simplicity. This is a point made time and again. 12 So if things appear in here, you expect them to be 13 followed. 14 Q. You have mentioned "formative process" and you have 15 mentioned "received principles". 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Is it right, then, to conclude that what one sees here 18 in the Good Medical Practice is something which enjoys 19 a broad consensus of the doctors? 20 A. Yes. We have corroborated that. In 1997 we 21 commissioned work which included sampling, 22 a representative sample of doctors. This was in the 23 course of laying some baseline data for our performance 24 procedures and how effective they may be, to find out 25 from doctors their perceptions of the duties of a doctor 0042 1 as set out on the inside page. There was a remarkable 2 degree of alignment between the sample and the 3 statements and duties of a doctor, the questions were 4 phrased, "Would you consider the breach of any of these 5 duties to be a matter which ought to attract sanction?" 6 But it also illuminated a gap in one important area, 7 which was in the broadest terms to do with relationships 8 with patients, communications. That cluster of matters 9 and the relationships with patients, where there was 10 evidence of a divergence between the GMC and the 11 profession, with fewer doctors, 43 per cent, I think -- 12 I can give it to you accurately in my notes, if you 13 wish, but a bigger proportion of doctors who did not see 14 the issue of relationships with patients as being of 15 such weight in the totality of the medical consultation 16 as to attract sanction if things went seriously wrong 17 with it. 18 That sort of intelligence which is again a new 19 step for the GMC, finding out how our guidance is 20 received, is important intelligence for us, because it 21 indicates where the gaps are. It is very interesting, 22 of course, and very important, because it coincides with 23 one of the areas from the public, from the patients, 24 where they say medicine is out of tune with society. 25 Once one begins to dip into the sample and explore it in 0043 1 this way, one begins to understand the reasons why, and 2 on that basis, of course, that you can then prepare for 3 further action. 4 Q. What you have been saying is that the Good Medical 5 Practice booklet reflects present views as to what 6 good medical practice is? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. In setting out standards, then, it does not seem to lead 9 the standards; just reflect them? 10 A. No. It is seeking to lead on standards -- 11 Q. But standards which already enjoy a broad consensus 12 because this reflects the existing view? 13 A. But nevertheless, to lead on standards. If one looks at 14 any development in medicine, it starts with a few 15 people, a new development, something new is developed, 16 it acquires a greater significance, people research it, 17 they write about it and so on and so forth. There comes 18 a point where it becomes embodied into medical practice, 19 but here is an example with medical and clinical audit, 20 if you wish, or in the second bullet point, appraisal of 21 your professional competence: appraisal is not 22 a mainline piece of medical practice at the moment. 23 We wish it to become so. We expect it to become so. 24 We have made that explicit now. 25 So there is a matter of leading professional 0044 1 opinion, given the heterogeneous nature of professional 2 opinion. I have offered you also the latest guidance on 3 consent. That most certainly leads rather than is 4 a reflection of a wide spectrum of agreement. 5 I want to make one other point. You have raised 6 the matter of "representative of the views of the 7 profession". We attach great importance to the things 8 that this guidance says being acceptable to the 9 patients, to reflect things that patients think are 10 important, and in constructing this guidance, we set 11 about seeking public opinion, patients' opinion, to an 12 extent that we had not done before. I have no similar 13 evidential statistical information to give about the 14 public expression, but I have a lot of anecdotal 15 evidence from patients and from managers and from 16 executive directors within the Health Service, people 17 who are not medical, that this guidance is reflecting 18 things that they want to see in a doctor, particularly 19 the matters to do with communications and 20 relationships. 21 Q. You have anticipated, I think, the questions that I was 22 going to address to you. If, indeed, this guidance were 23 purely reflective of the existing views of the 24 profession, the broad consensus views of the profession, 25 there would be no significant point, apart from the few 0045 1 who did not share in that consensus, in putting it down 2 in writing, except for consumption by the general 3 public, by those who were not doctors. 4 What you are saying, as I understand it, is that 5 that is part and parcel of the publication, to inform 6 the general public, but also you are saying that there 7 is an extent to which the standards lead rather than 8 reflect. 9 Have I got it right? 10 A. Yes, that is absolutely correct, and we are already 11 planning the edition of Good Medical Practice. This is 12 a refining process, and we are exploring actively how we 13 can engage the public even further in this process, 14 because we want the standards and values set out here; 15 we want the public and the profession to come as close 16 together as possible on their mutual understanding on 17 what the qualities of a good doctor are. 18 Q. Given what we see in paragraph 7 on the right-hand side, 19 that audit is new in 1998 compared to 1995, you say this 20 is a development. The second bullet point is 21 leadership, in other words, it does not enjoy the status 22 of reflecting existing opinion as much as leading it. 23 Would a statement in terms of paragraph 7 probably, in 24 your view, have been acceptable in the 1995 25 publication -- acceptable to the profession? 0046 1 A. I think opinion had moved on in that time, but I think, 2 also, that if we take the second bullet point in 3 particular, it is less to do with what opinion was about 4 than what it is actually necessary to do to achieve the 5 kind of preventive measures that we are describing. You 6 cannot detach the advice here, the guidance here, from 7 the other broader policy development than I am 8 describing. 9 If I can just perhaps clarify that: whilst this 10 guidance was being written, between 1995 and 1998, we 11 had conducted extensive discussions outside in the 12 course of implementing or preparing for the 13 implementation of performance procedures across the 14 country, with Managers in the health service, Chief 15 Executives, Chairmen, doctors, patients, patients' 16 organisations, and had gathered a far better 17 understanding of the problems inherent in developing 18 ways and means of making sure that doctors not only 19 understood that they needed to keep themselves up to 20 date, but how you would actually demonstrate that. An 21 appraisal was one method, one instrument, which is 22 widely used outside of medicine but not inside medicine, 23 which seemed to be appropriate. 24 So this is not sort of divined as it were in vacuo 25 from the world outside. I just wanted to make that 0047 1 clear. 2 Q. Does it follow from the answer you have given me that 3 the answer to my earlier question is that, no, it would 4 not have been acceptable to the profession in 1995 to 5 have the statement we now see as 7 in that form? 6 A. Yes, I think that is fair, particularly with the "must" 7 which is there. 8 Q. It would follow that, working back in time from 1995 to 9 1992 into the late 1980s and earlier, all the more so 10 would that be true of those days? 11 A. Many doctors felt quite ambivalent about audit and what 12 it means and what their obligations are. 13 Q. And what you are describing, really, is the 14 manifestation of a struggle, is it, to convince doubters 15 in the profession of there being any value in audit as 16 it is set out here? 17 A. There were quite genuine differences of opinion based 18 upon experiences of the value of audit in the 19 profession, different experiences in different parts of 20 the profession. Audit able to be taken much further, 21 much more quickly in some parts of medicine, surgery is 22 a good example, obstetrics is another example, where 23 harder-edged standards, clinical standards, against 24 which to measure were available. 25 So the notion that it was audit moving forward on 0048 1 a broad front, as it were, with a level of 2 sophistication consistent right across the whole of 3 medicine, is -- medicine is not like that. It just was 4 not possible to do it in that kind of way. 5 Psychiatrists, for instance, find great difficulty, much 6 more difficulty than surgeons do, looking for hard-edged 7 standards to assess. 8 Q. So the answer to my question is yes, generally, so far 9 as medicine is concerned, but not necessarily for 10 specific disciplines? 11 A. Yes, that is correct. 12 MR LANGSTAFF: Sir, on that note, I note the time. Perhaps 13 we can now have our first break? 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, shall we adjourn now and reconvene at 15 1.15? Thank you. 16 (12.35 pm) 17 (Adjourned until 1.15 pm) 18 (1.25 pm) 19 MR LANGSTAFF: Before we broke for lunch, we were talking 20 about the change in development in the profession's 21 attitude to audit. Before the contracts of doctors in 22 1991 included the requirement that they took part in 23 then medical audit, was there any form of professional 24 requirement that doctors should do so? 25 A. Before 1991? 0049 1 Q. Yes. 2 A. Not that I am aware of. There was not in any GMC 3 guidance. 4 Q. So far as any guidance given by any Royal College to the 5 effect that audit was desirable, that would be 6 a recommendation, a standard, which would lack any 7 sanction for its breach, would it? 8 A. Yes. I mean, I think the earliest reference was in the 9 GMC document in 1993, "Tomorrow's Doctors". I have made 10 reference to that. 11 Q. That was looking essentially to the education of 12 tomorrow's doctors? 13 A. I am citing it as the fact that it was being introduced 14 to GMC documents at that stage. I am not aware of it 15 earlier. 16 Q. You yourself described in an article which you have 17 shown us, Quality and Standards in Health Care, 18 WIT 51/30, how quality and standards related in health 19 care in the United States and the United Kingdom 20 historically, up until the date which I think was 1993, 21 when you and Liam Donaldson wrote that particular 22 article? 23 A. This was written in 1991. 24 Q. Published in 1993? 25 A. Published in 1993. 0050 1 Q. So you were here yourself, in 1991, advocating a form of 2 quality assurance by testing performance against 3 published standards and altering performance if that 4 test should show that performance was lacking? 5 A. That is correct, and it was more than advocating it. 6 I had had by then considerable involvement and 7 experience of doing that, with colleagues in general 8 practice. 9 Q. You mention on page 31, at the bottom, the story of 10 Ernest Codman. This is 1910 in America, and Ernest 11 Codman you tell us pioneered looking at end results? 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. A form very similar to clinical audit as we know it 14 today, is it? 15 A. Yes. The object was the same. 16 Q. It looked at outcomes in terms of results and thereby 17 evaluated the performance. That was the philosophy of 18 it, was it? 19 A. He wanted to try and make sure that as far as possible, 20 he could account for the results of his surgery. He was 21 unsuccessful in trying to introduce that idea more 22 widely, as I explained. 23 Q. What you tell us in the rest of the article is that the 24 American doctors found that idea contentious and instead 25 of an end result, quality cycle approach taking on, the 0051 1 American doctors decided they would insist on a set of 2 professional standards? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. That was the way in which they sought to ensure quality 5 of performance? 6 A. That is correct. That was the start of their engagement 7 in the development of a framework for looking at 8 quality. 9 Q. So what one sees historically, looking back to the 1910s 10 and 1920s in America, was a resistance amongst the 11 medical profession there to the idea of any individual 12 surgeon or unit's performance being evaluated in any 13 objective way; it was rather left to the professional to 14 comply with standards which have general acceptance? 15 A. Yes. I mean, I think the objection, as far as I know -- 16 this is from historical documents, obviously -- was to 17 the idea of producing personal results, which is what 18 uniquely Codman did. 19 Q. Did one have an exactly similar reaction to such ideas 20 in the 1980s in the UK? 21 A. There is a long gap between 1912 and 1980 -- 22 Q. It is not the time, it is the reaction I am asking 23 about. 24 A. No, I disagree with you, because in the 1980s, by this 25 time many doctors in the United States, and in Britain, 0052 1 were engaged, as I was with many colleagues, in this 2 kind of exploration, and use of these methods. Indeed, 3 if you -- I cannot find the page, but I refer also to 4 the early engagement in this country of the confidential 5 enquiries into maternal mortality and subsequently 6 perinatal mortality which laid the foundations for 7 modern ante natal care and much improved safety. That 8 was enthusiastically taken up and worked on by 9 obstetricians in this country. 10 In 1975 my colleagues and I in the north of 11 England, those involved in teaching practices, were 12 actively engaged in audit of our own work and the 13 collective discussion of our results, and by 1985 14 onwards, we mounted a large study in teaching practices 15 in the north of England, I think 67 practices involved 16 in the business of setting standards for common 17 conditions in childhood, children under the age of 11, 18 both acute and chronic, and then testing actual practice 19 against those standards. We learned a huge amount from 20 those studies, and they are published, about 21 opportunities but also the limitations of that process, 22 in particular what went on when doctors were attempting 23 to work out what was and what was not acceptable 24 practice. 25 So that sort of ethos was well-established in part 0053 1 of general practice at that time. 2 Lastly, in parallel with that, I was involved in 3 this from the start, but with many other colleagues, 4 general practice introduced -- in bringing in vocational 5 training in the late 1960s and the early 1970s -- 6 a system of explicit standards in the selection of 7 trainers and their practices for general practice. That 8 was coupled with the monitoring of those standards, the 9 periodic review of those standards by peers, and 10 a decision as to whether to renew or not a trainer's 11 contract on the basis of results. 12 So the ethos of external review using explicit 13 standards was well-established by then. It is that sort 14 of ethos that, for instance, in Northumberland today, in 15 the County of Northumberland, enables the Health 16 Authority and the doctors to work constructively and 17 collaboratively to ensure good practice and deal with 18 problems when they arise because it builds on a culture 19 and ethos of review which was established over 15 to 20 20 years. 21 I have to emphasise that point: changes in culture 22 and behaviour can take some time to establish. But it 23 would be quite wrong to say that the general reactions 24 to Codman in 1912 were typical of reactions in the 25 country. 0054 1 Outside of general practice, the surgeons, the 2 CEPOD enquiries which were started by surgeons and by 3 anaesthetists to examine practice were, to the best of 4 my knowledge, well received generally by surgeons. Some 5 surgeons did not agree, of course, but the vast majority 6 who wanted to do a good job for their patients took part 7 in that kind of activity. 8 Q. You took something like the register maintained by the 9 Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons. Again, you would 10 have a collection of data from those surgeons who 11 submitted the data from their units, which could be 12 pooled and the results of which no doubt were of use to 13 clinicians. But one of the features of which we have 14 heard in this Inquiry so far of the register was that, 15 at any rate in the early days and to an extent up until 16 the present, any contributor to the databank was ensured 17 of anonymity as to surgeons, but also as to units. 18 The consequence would be that there would be great 19 difficulty in anyone other than the individual clinician 20 assessing his or her performance against anybody else's. 21 To what extent was that a problem, as you see it, 22 in the development of seeing how individuals were 23 performing to standard during the 1980s and early 1990s? 24 A. Well, it was a real problem, and it still is today, as 25 a leader in the British Medical Journal of last Saturday 0055 1 demonstrates. It is the difficulty of on the one hand 2 trying to achieve a level of openness which in my 3 experience most conscientious doctors want to achieve, 4 with the real difficulty of being able to find a safe 5 environment in which to discuss results when it is not 6 clear actually what those results actually mean. 7 Much of the discussion about audit and the 8 introduction of audit in the late 1980s/1990s was how to 9 handle that difficult problem, because of course, if it 10 was not capable of resolution -- and it is still an 11 imperfect world in this sense -- then one of the 12 difficulties would be to reinforce attendance if 13 a doctor is not to discuss those issues, and in 14 particular, to drive underground matters to do with 15 perhaps marginal rather than very, very obviously 16 dysfunctional practice. 17 It is a kind of an illustration of two competing 18 goods which are in conflict with each other. I think 19 the only significance of the leader in the BMJ this week 20 is to indicate that it is still not resolved. 21 Q. So you have seen this as a gradual process towards the 22 present degree of openness, have you? 23 A. Yes. That is absolutely true, but I think it has to be 24 seen, also, with a rising awareness within the 25 profession, that performance matters; that how the 0056 1 individual doctor behaves and whether the doctor is 2 clinically effective or not has to be much more 3 explicit, so the question is now less whether that is 4 a good idea, but rather, what are the best means of 5 achieving that objective. 6 Q. Because any measurement of individual or unit 7 performance must necessarily have a comparator, must it 8 not? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And what you have said a couple of answers ago was that 11 there was concern about making any comparison from 12 whatever data was available because the data might not 13 be clear enough or might be open to misinterpretation. 14 That was the flavour of the answer you were giving? 15 A. Yes. I think we actually have to separate out two main 16 elements. There is one about the matter of data and its 17 validity and reliability and also how you can get it; 18 but there is also the matter of the instrument against 19 which you are measuring in the first place, and the 20 extent to which it is possible to identify elements of 21 practice where there is no dispute, for instance, as to 22 the evidence as to what ideally should or should not be 23 done, those elements of practice where there are 24 variations in practice yet doctors know that this is 25 what should be done, and other elements where there 0057 1 really are many options. 2 I think we have, as a profession -- it is by no 3 means peculiar to this country -- begun to dig into this 4 business of disentangling what really can stand from 5 what cannot stand. This is the whole basis of a drive 6 towards evidence-based practice. 7 I was in Nijmegen only three or four days ago at 8 the end of last week at a scientific meeting discussing 9 these matters and the current state of art and this is 10 still a real problem, although I am bound to say in the 11 last ten years, compared with where things were in the 12 late 1980s, huge progress has been made in the 13 investment of professional effort and government effort 14 in trying to disentangle these matters. 15 Q. Given that one has to have data; secondly a means of 16 interpreting it, the third element of the equation is 17 the doctor himself who is either going to make use of 18 the interpretation or supply the information in the 19 first place. 20 So far as audit information was concerned in the 21 1980s, was the importance of the interpretation seen 22 essentially as educational rather than informative to 23 the wider public? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Has it now changed? 0058 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. You refer in your statement -- let us look at it; it is 3 WIT 51/2(c) to "Changing Patient Expectations". 4 What do you, in your statement, see as the 5 expectations of the patients? 6 A. I think the change in expectations has been one of the 7 major changes in society, as well as in relation to 8 medicine, that people have -- ordinary people, all of 9 us, when we become ill, or relatives, are keener to know 10 what is being done and why to look for effective 11 explanations, generally to be willing to question the 12 doctor in a most constructive way. I think this is 13 a huge development of trend, and it is one of the wider 14 consumer revolutions, as it were, which is greatly to be 15 welcomed. 16 Q. So this does tie in with what I have been asking you 17 about the availability of information? 18 A. I am not an expert on this, but generally speaking, the 19 consumer revolution coming in from the United States as 20 it has done, has certainly been fuelled to some extent 21 on the back of availability to information and there is 22 no doubt from my own experience now that the quantum 23 leap in the availability of information since any 24 patient or any citizen can interrogate the database of 25 medicine through the Internet is accelerating that whole 0059 1 process, which is why I referred also to the shifting 2 balance between patient and doctor in the balance of 3 power and the doctor/patient relationship. 4 Many doctors find this quite a challenge, but for 5 every doctor who does, there are at least as many who 6 see it as a positive benefit and welcome the robust 7 discussion of matters to do with the diagnosis and 8 management of a patient's condition. It is a very 9 important new contributor to quality. 10 Q. So by "patients' expectations" in that part of your 11 statement, you are talking about explanations, 12 information, the ability to have material upon which one 13 might question the doctor, and such like? 14 A. I am, but I am also conscious, we are talking about 15 a trend again of patients being more prepared, more 16 willing, to ask questions about the individual doctor's 17 performance, "How likely, doctor...", "How safe will 18 I be in your hands?" 19 Q. At page 14, paragraph 59 of your statement, you mention 20 one of the themes which runs through what you say, which 21 is the importance of the consultation. You speak from 22 someone who -- your experience is in general practice? 23 You are nodding. I say that for the transcript. 24 A. Yes, I am sorry. 25 Q. -- where inevitably the consultation is likely to be 0060 1 a one-to-one, is it? 2 A. Yes, although team-based care is part and parcel of 3 general practice. 4 Q. To what extent, in using the word "professionalism" in 5 paragraph 59, are you saying, "Well, whatever the 6 available information may be, the doctor is he who knows 7 best"? 8 A. I am not saying that at all. I am saying, in this 9 paragraph, how vital it is to recognise that for the 10 patient the quality of the consultation and all that 11 flows from that in terms of diagnosis and treatment is 12 immensely dependent on the integrity and the ability of 13 the doctor to try and get things right. Most decisions 14 in medicine -- not just general practice -- are still 15 taken in relative privacy. It is that recognition of 16 that very fundamental fact that leads us, or has led us 17 in the GMC, to place such an emphasis on the culture. 18 You cannot supervise the millions and millions and 19 millions of independent individual decisions that are 20 made about, "Is it this treatment rather than that?", 21 "Is it this pill?", "Do I do this now or at another 22 time?" et cetera. 23 So the whole system I am putting here has to be 24 geared to trying to make sure that doctors get it right 25 first time as often as possible, and conduct themselves 0061 1 in a way that patients find helpful and which they 2 expect. It goes to the very heart of the whole 3 regulatory question. 4 Q. I understand knowledge, I understand skills in the 5 context of the consultation. Plainly the doctor has to 6 bring both to bear and the expectation of both doctor 7 and patient will be that the doctor will do his best to 8 produce the -- 9 A. The best outcome. 10 Q. The right result, the best outcome? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Where is there space for integrity? How does integrity 13 fit into that picture? 14 A. In the consistency with which the doctor follows and 15 uses the knowledge and skills that he or she may have in 16 the willingness to be honest about the limitations of 17 the doctor's own practice, to refer to others when the 18 need arises: the things that are to do with putting the 19 patient's best interests first, which of course, right 20 at the front is the matter of the patient's safety. 21 That is a part which is absolutely central to the ethos 22 of medicine and pre-dates all the various statements 23 that we have been talking about here. 24 Q. So is professionalism in essence a commitment to 25 attempting to produce the best result for the patient 0062 1 with appropriate knowledge and skill? 2 A. And attitude. 3 Q. And approach? 4 A. And approach. May I just add one point? We have quite 5 deliberately distinguished between matters of 6 competence, the knowledge and skill that a doctor may 7 possess, and the question of performance, by which we 8 mean the way in which the doctor applies that knowledge 9 and skill, and attitude, if you like, why our whole 10 procedures are based upon performance, because what 11 matters to the patient is what the doctor does with the 12 knowledge and skill, not whether he happens to have it 13 or not. 14 Q. And how he does it? 15 A. And how he does it. Competence, the possession of the 16 attributes of knowledge and skill, is subsumed within 17 the concept of performance, the application of it. 18 Q. And in each case, what he does and how he does it, is 19 open, in an ideal system, is it, to review by 20 measurement against the standards that the patient would 21 legitimately expect? 22 A. Yes. I mean, it has been not technically possible until 23 recent times, really, to do this, but the principle of 24 external review has nevertheless been there in 25 medicine. It is there, for instance, in the use of 0063 1 external assessors in examinations; it has been there in 2 the practice of many surgeons for many years, to visit 3 colleagues, to watch them operating. I have had 4 colleagues, including senior colleagues, visiting me and 5 watching consulting and vice versa, so the notion of 6 that type of observation is not new. What is much newer 7 is the capacity through information technology in 8 particular to think of instruments for assessment which 9 just were not feasible before: it is that kind of 10 exploration we were into in the late 1980s in general 11 practice. 12 Q. So as evidence grows through the availability of 13 information technology, the range of, if I can use the 14 word, "permissible" decisions and the range of 15 permissible manners in which a doctor may make those 16 decisions with a patient, will get less, will it? 17 A. Almost certainly so. There is a balance to be struck 18 because the doctor, in any circumstance, has to take 19 account in making an assessment of the individual 20 patient and the condition with which the patient is 21 presenting, but there is no doubt about the fact that 22 the development of the clinical guideline which is 23 simply a statement of best practice, produced in a much 24 more accessible way than was possible with textbooks, 25 which were also statements of good practice, brings to 0064 1 the doctor's attention what current practice actually 2 is. But as any doctor will say, and I think any patient 3 will say, I hope at the end of the day, taking full 4 account of best practice through guidelines, the doctor 5 will, nevertheless, have to exercise some judgment as to 6 what, at this particular moment with this particular 7 condition, is right for the patient. What is new, or 8 relatively new, is the extent to which doctors engage 9 their patients with that form of decision-making. 10 I have not practised since 1995, but I used to sit 11 with a television screen on the desk and we would review 12 matters together, write a letter and, you know, "Is this 13 an accurate reflection of what you think?" "Let us look 14 at the options available for referral to this doctor or 15 that doctor", et cetera. 16 So that kind of engagement between doctor and 17 patient has been developing in the last 10 years or so. 18 I know you understand my background in general practice, 19 where much emphasis has been given to that dimension to 20 the consultation. We are reading a lot of this across 21 into specialist practice now. 22 Q. Given the information technology, given the 23 collaborative approach with the patient that now applies 24 when it might not have done, what, if anything, is left 25 of scope for clinical freedom, other than simply the 0065 1 exercise of a professional evidence-based judgment? 2 A. That is a very big statement. 3 Q. I am asking. It is a question not a statement. 4 A. I think I am perhaps just testing, then, what is left. 5 The answer at the present time in the present state of 6 knowledge, is "a huge amount", because actually the more 7 we learn about developing evidence-based practice, the 8 more it becomes clear that there are areas of practice 9 where absolute certainty does not exist. Hence the huge 10 investment and the development, for instance, of the 11 National Institute for Clinical Excellence which is all 12 about trying to bring greater precision, greater 13 objectivity to these questions. 14 But the other area which the clinical guideline 15 does not deal with particularly well is the fact that at 16 any point in time, a doctor with a patient is having to 17 make decisions on perhaps imperfect information, 18 imperfect data about that patient's particular 19 condition. He or she cannot wait, as a scientist would 20 wait in a laboratory, for example, to say, "I will not 21 make a decision until I have a very complete picture". 22 People and their illnesses are not like that. So 23 clinical decision-making is still based on making the 24 best judgment you can on the available evidence to you 25 at that particular moment. 0066 1 It carries with it the responsibility on the 2 doctor, therefore, to have an attitude of mind which is 3 one of openness and a willingness to revise those 4 decisions in the light of further information which may 5 become available. 6 Q. At WIT 51/111. This is part of Maintaining a Good 7 Standard of Professional Practice? 8 A. Yes, Good Medical Practice came first. This coincided 9 or virtually coincided with the second edition. 10 Q. At the bottom of the left-hand column, just highlight 11 that, Good Medical Practice explains, for example, that 12 every doctor must be professionally competent and 13 secondly, perform consistently well. 14 Can you help me with that statement? Where does 15 one find that in Good Medical Practice, in terms? 16 A. It is a synthesis really, an encapsulation of the spirit 17 of good medical practice that doctors must be 18 professionally competent and from that flows the notion 19 that the doctor will apply knowledge and skill 20 consistently, as I said in my answer to you a moment or 21 two ago. 22 Q. So consistency becomes here a professional obligation 23 spelt out as such, whereas one has to derive it from 24 looking through Good Medical Practice? 25 A. I think that is fair comment. I will note that myself, 0067 1 thank you. 2 Q. In terms of performing consistently well, one is looking 3 for an objective measure of performance which takes into 4 account, no doubt, the range of options available to him 5 which clinical freedom still permits? 6 A. Yes. You have to see this guidance in its context, 7 which is saying, in the units, clinical teams within 8 which doctors practise, with other colleagues, nursing 9 colleagues, other medical colleagues, et cetera -- this 10 is setting up the basis of quality assured practice, 11 another change in the culture of medicine which we think 12 is fundamental, and so it is setting out as it were the 13 ground rules for each doctor, "You must conduct yourself 14 in this kind of way", and then there is the broader 15 context in which a clinical team ought to be able to 16 review the individual practice of each member. That is 17 where it is all about this refining and trying to 18 clarify, make more explicit, this responsibility for 19 maintaining consistency at the point where care is 20 delivered, or as near to that point as possible. The 21 individual clinician and the team. 22 Q. I am glad you mentioned the "team", because what I was 23 going to go on, having asked you about that, to deal 24 with was the reaction of the GMC and what one can derive 25 about the culture of doctors at the time, to the failure 0068 1 of the Private Members Bill in the 1980s, which was 2 addressing the question of the word "serious", was it 3 not, when it came to professional misconduct? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. And am I right in thinking that part of the reason why 6 the bill may well have failed was that the GMC at the 7 time indicated that it had in mind taking steps to 8 resolve the problem that the private member appeared to 9 have identified? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Did it take, as it happens, some 12 years after that 12 before the performance procedures were actually 13 introduced? 14 A. There was an important step before that, which followed 15 virtually immediately. We have to go to the change in 16 guidance in the 1985 Blue Book, page 10, and the 17 reference there to "explicit clinical standards". That 18 represented the first development of an explicit 19 statement of expectation from a doctor, and as 20 I referred to in an earlier response to you, that finds 21 its way now into the current guidance. But it was more 22 than that; it formed the basis against which charges of 23 serious professional misconduct were framed and accounts 24 for the substantial rise in the proportion of clinical 25 cases which appeared before the Professional Conduct 0069 1 Committee. It makes the matter very explicit. 2 FMS 4, page 10 -- 3 Q. You are reading the number from the top right-hand 4 corner, are you? 5 A. I do not have any numbers on my top right-hand corner. 6 Q. We will try and identify the number for you. 7 A. It was in Mr Scott's evidence. 8 Q. Yes. We are just looking up the reference. 9 A. It was the 1985 Blue Book, part 2. 10 Q. WIT 62/145. You may find the reference at page 153. 11 We are looking at the covering sheet, there. It is the 12 left-hand page, is it not? 13 A. Yes. You will see it in the middle there, the 14 paragraph beginning "The public are entitled to 15 expect ... This includes ..." It is that paragraph. 16 That is the first time that kind of explicit 17 statement occurred. That statement forms the basis, as 18 I have said, of a "fitness to practise" procedures 19 action in appropriate cases. 20 Q. Writing in 1987, which would be two years after that, 21 I promised I would come back to the quotation from 22 Marilyn Rosenthal in her book dealing with medical 23 malpractice. I will read it to you because we do not 24 have it scanned in. 25 She says: 0070 1 "A major issue is also the relationship of the GMC 2 disciplinary functions to other mechanisms in the 3 British medical malpractice system with statutory 4 responsibilities, particularly the family practitioner 5 committees and the NHS authorities with responsibility 6 for the hospital doctors and the courts." 7 Then she says this: 8 "The GMC is resisting the enlargement of its own 9 disciplinary responsibilities and would certainly prefer 10 to let these other mechanisms deal with as much as 11 possible, particularly the difficult problems of medical 12 malpractice and maloccurrence. The key point, however, 13 is that it is the GMC which maintains the register to 14 practise and the GMC that controls the ultimate 15 sanctions. The register to practise is maintained by 16 a professional body, not a public body." 17 I want to ask you about a suggestion from her 18 observation that the GMC was resisting enlargement of 19 its own disciplinary responsibilities and would prefer 20 to let the other mechanisms, that is the NHS authorities 21 and the courts, deal particularly with medical 22 malpractice and maloccurrence. 23 As an historical snapshot, is it right or wrong? 24 A. Could you remind me of the date again, please? 25 Q. 1987. That is when it was published. It may have been 0071 1 written months before that. 2 A. I think it was probably an accurate historical snapshot 3 in the sense that the Council is not itself 4 a homogeneous entity; it is like any other group of 5 people. Professor Kennedy will remember this as 6 a member of the GMC. I think then that the translation 7 from, as it were, one approach to a different approach 8 took time, and not everybody agreed overnight that 9 a different approach was required; it had to be argued 10 through, and there were, I remember vividly, some very 11 robust arguments indeed. 12 Q. So in the late 1980s, the debate was raging; is that 13 another way of putting it? 14 A. The debate was raging -- the debate was continuing about 15 the necessity of that on the one hand, but there was 16 another altogether different debate, which was about the 17 question of evidence and what could be done to close the 18 gap in the system, the GMC's own procedures, to deal 19 with performance-related matters. I mean, the genesis 20 of the performance procedures was there then. 21 Q. Because the nearest that one would have to dealing with 22 performance would be, if the ill-health procedures could 23 be stretched far enough, "somebody who performs like 24 this must be ill"? 25 A. Yes. I think that we were pretty clear then, as 0072 1 I recollect it, that there were two quite different 2 categories of doctors. There is always an overlap in 3 terms of the way in which they present. Those who 4 manifestly had a health problem, that might or might not 5 include matters to do with their clinical practice; and 6 there was the separate category where you knew there was 7 a pattern of repeated poor practice, but none of it at 8 any point, any of those incidents, sufficient that you 9 could bring the conduct procedures to bear. That was 10 the genesis of the performance procedures, to alter the 11 evidential basis upon which one looked at a doctor's 12 practice away from a single incident to a pattern of 13 practice over time. The impetus for much of that flowed 14 obviously from people who were critical of the system, 15 but obviously inside also, from the many of us who were 16 involved in the conduct procedures and could see 17 intimately in the presentation of evidence to us, 18 "Clearly something must be wrong here", and yet the 19 point could not be proved. 20 So it was less to do with, if you like, the 21 standard of proof than the nature of the evidence. That 22 is why the new procedures were routed in a different 23 form of evidence. 24 Q. The word "serious" remains? 25 A. Yes. 0073 1 Q. So what was the object of the criticism in Parliament 2 remains as a feature of the scheme and only now its 3 serious deficiency in professional practice? 4 A. I am not sure that is true. I had discussions with 5 Mr Spearing myself in my other capacity in the Royal 6 College of General Practitioners at the time, and as 7 I recall it, his concerns were about getting serious 8 clinical practice looked at. I think he was looking for 9 mechanisms whereby that might be done. I know he was 10 also concerned about threshold; I do not wish to deny 11 that in any way. 12 Q. There are two threshold limitations, are there, to 13 treating anything as seriously deficient medical 14 practice? One is the need to have the word "serious" 15 looked at and defined and applied, whatever it may mean, 16 and the second is, is it, the standard of proof? 17 A. Yes, there are two elements. 18 Q. So if it is more likely than not that a practitioner was 19 seriously deficient in performance, and it would follow 20 his patient is at risk, nonetheless, there would be, as 21 it stands at present, no right for the GMC to apply any 22 sanction? 23 A. I think you are touching on an interesting development 24 which is very much in our minds now. It relates to the 25 question, so who defines "seriously deficient", because 0074 1 of course "seriously deficient" could be quite an open 2 definition if one chose to make it that way. 3 In the operation of the performance procedures, we 4 have said publicly, before they started, that at the 5 beginning of the understanding of what "seriously 6 deficient performance" actually means in terms of real 7 patients and real doctors' performance would come 8 through the examination of the cases, the case law 9 developed. We undertook -- I made a very specific 10 public undertaking that we would put into the public 11 domain as soon as we were able to the results of the 12 cases and in sufficient detail that the profession and 13 the public could form their own view as to whether this 14 seems to be recognisable deficiency of performance and 15 therefore whether the threshold might be right or not. 16 This is a quite different way of thinking and of 17 course this is exactly what we are attempting to do now. 18 The first three cases of the performance 19 procedures, the results were published in what some of 20 my colleagues in the profession thought was breathtaking 21 detail and clarity. It is only by that that we will 22 form some kind of consensus view which needs to be 23 broader than the GMC of what "serious" actually means. 24 Q. I do not want in these questions to trespass upon what 25 is properly to be considered in Phase II of the Inquiry, 0075 1 which is the future. I have little doubt that topics 2 such as serious deficiencies in professional practice 3 may be revisited at that stage, but just so that I have 4 your view at the moment, you used a moment ago the 5 expression "recognisable deficiency", hoping that the 6 public could judge for themselves whether there was 7 a recognisable deficiency. 8 If, let us suppose, the requirement before 9 a sanction could be applied, whatever that sanction 10 might be, was deficiency, which had to be established 11 beyond a reasonable doubt, that would have to be 12 a recognisable deficiency, would it not? 13 A. Yes. I mean, the GMC enquiries are all about a doctor's 14 fitness to practise, for that doctor to have 15 unrestricted registration, so the thing that has to be 16 right; it is a serious matter. I was trying to 17 disentangle the two elements here: what is serious 18 deficiency from the standard of proof, the evidence that 19 might be required to get to that point. Without 20 trespassing into Stage 2, I was trying to give an 21 indication of the thinking that was going on in the 22 early 1990s about the question of "serious" and whether 23 it had some kind of very fixed meaning or whether it was 24 capable of broader interpretation. That is the view we 25 have come to. 0076 1 Q. Dr Armstrong, when he gave evidence to us from the 2 British Medical Association, regarded the question of 3 fitness to be a doctor as a different question from the 4 question "Can the doctor do the job?" He said that the 5 question "Can he do the job?" was for the employer to 6 decide: "Is he fit to be a doctor?" was for the GMC. 7 Is that distinction a valid one? 8 A. Yes, in the sense that, as I indicated earlier, the GMC 9 cannot, and should not, supervise individual doctors at 10 work. That is an employment responsibility. 11 Q. What, then, of the question: "Is he competent or 12 incompetent at what he does as a doctor?" Is that the 13 same as fitness to be a doctor? 14 A. It is included within fitness to be a doctor. 15 Q. So that if one had a doctor who was incompetent in 16 a number of respects, although otherwise fit, he would 17 or would not be subject, do you think, to the 18 professional practice sanctions of the GMC as the word 19 "serious" is interpreted? 20 A. I think we are back to the starting point about how 21 people come into the procedures in the first place and 22 the reason why the GMC is placing such emphasis on the 23 whole question of prevention, of raising awareness in 24 the profession's mind about what duties and 25 responsibilities are and through things like maintaining 0077 1 good medical practice, getting it into people's minds, 2 this would be reinforced through the clinical governance 3 kind of arrangements, that it is not just an awareness 4 but actually being able to demonstrate a fitness to 5 practise is the right way of handling this. 6 If one makes that kind of approach -- and as you 7 know, we have taken the decisions to change the basis of 8 registration so that doctors in future have to be able 9 to demonstrate on an ongoing basis their fitness to 10 practise. If they cannot demonstrate that, to be 11 referred into our procedures where they can be looked 12 at, then one has really altered the ground rules of the 13 game very, very significantly indeed and there are 14 various steps along the way to any question of serious 15 deficiency. This sort of approach involving every 16 single doctor who is practising in that demonstration of 17 good practice, will, if it works as intended, raise 18 questions which will need to be addressed where the 19 doctor's practice may be quite short of the threshold, 20 but where there is a doubt. Enquiry needs to be made 21 here as to why this doctor does not quite seem to be 22 meeting what will be the requirements for revalidation, 23 and then there is a series of steps that would flow from 24 that. 25 This seems to us to be the only sensible way of 0078 1 addressing the inherent weakness of any 2 complaints-driven system, whether it is the GMC's or 3 whether it is the NHS's arrangements, and that is 4 actually of having a systematic on-going demonstration 5 of fitness to practise. 6 Q. The last question that I am going to ask you in this 7 particular area, before I turn to something applied to 8 it but slightly different, leaving as I will the 9 unanswered questions for the future to be dealt with at 10 Phase II of the Inquiry, is this: you mentioned that the 11 employment consequences differ from the fitness to 12 practise GMC approach, as Dr Mac Armstrong addressed to 13 us. Is there a potential problem, has there been any 14 potential problem, in employers such as Trusts taking 15 action to restrict or prevent the practice of a doctor 16 in a particular field, where they think he may be 17 incompetent, because they understand the GMC is 18 conducting its own investigation? 19 Put another way, does the investigation by the GMC 20 tend to inhibit an employer in taking action? 21 A. I have heard that said, but I know of no reason why that 22 should be the case. 23 I would add to that, there has also been 24 a perception and in fact the reality is that the GMC 25 would tend to follow in the situation where an 0079 1 investigation might be going on locally; nothing would 2 be done by the GMC until a matter had been resolved one 3 way or another locally. That practice has been 4 changed. It may still actually happen, but 5 nevertheless, we have altered our practice so that the 6 GMC action can follow at any time that we have been 7 alerted to the need for an investigation by a complaint. 8 Q. I am not sure that in your answers thus far you have 9 dealt with the application of the appropriate test which 10 is beyond reasonable doubt for both practice as 11 I understand it and conduct. 12 To what extent would you seek to justify a "beyond 13 reasonable doubt" test of either conduct or competence, 14 rather than an on balance test, bearing in mind that the 15 object, at least so far as practise is concerned, is the 16 protection of the public? 17 A. The protection of the public is paramount. If the test 18 as presently applied were shown to be of putting people 19 at risk, then we would be the first to want to 20 re-examine that. 21 This is slightly anticipating, but it helps the 22 question: we are actually, as part of our major review 23 of the practises and procedures of fitness to practise 24 which I initiated in 1995 -- it is a long way down the 25 line now, but we are looking beyond that to some of the 0080 1 more fundamental questions underpinning fitness to 2 practise which has to do with issues to do with the 3 threshold, the test of evidence, et cetera, but we do 4 not want to take that in isolation; it has to be part 5 and parcel of a wider examination, and it has to be part 6 and parcel of all the other pieces of the puzzle which 7 are coming together and which I have been describing. 8 I should add, by the way, just in relation to the 9 fitness to practise arrangements, you asked me if 10 I agreed with you this morning that they were 11 essentially punitive, and I said yes, and I do not 12 actually agree with that. There is a punitive element 13 to them, but of course they are primarily about 14 maintaining the public interest and the safety of 15 patients. I am sure you know that from the various 16 matters that have been published. I would not like to 17 leave you with that wrong impression. 18 Q. I did not tell you I was finishing all the questioning 19 altogether, because I am going to turn to another area, 20 but whilst we are talking about the "reasonable doubt" 21 approach, did the existence of that as a standard in 22 effect mean that any case that came before a scrutineer 23 without any corroboration, just an uncorroborated 24 complaint, would tend to get dismissed at the scrutiny 25 stage, or not? 0081 1 A. No. You mean at the initial scrutiny stage? 2 Q. Yes. 3 A. One would look for evidence of the bona fides of the 4 complaint. We actually apply strict tests which we have 5 altered recently, to make it easier for complainants, 6 with access to the procedures that has been too 7 unfriendly and too difficult for many people to get 8 through. We have spent a lot of time recently looking 9 at how, when a complaint is made to us, we can help 10 a complainant clarify, refine, explain, exactly what the 11 problem seems to be. 12 We have also changed our practice in the sense 13 that if a complaint is clearly not within or appears not 14 to be within our purview of trying to be helpful with 15 complainants, so if it is more appropriately dealt with 16 by another authority -- it might be by the employer, for 17 instance, or it might a matter of taking something to 18 law -- that we help people as best as possible to find 19 the way forward. We entirely accept that our practice 20 has been less than helpful in that respect in the past 21 and we and our staff are very keen to make that work 22 right. 23 I think the other point, before you leave it, it 24 was my perhaps less than full answer to your question 25 about employers. In terms of employers referring cases 0082 1 into the GMC, and their understanding of whether it 2 might be easy or not, we have become much clearer in the 3 course of introducing the performance procedures how 4 difficult it may appear, or the extent to which 5 employers may not know what the basis of essentially 6 good medical practice might be, and that lies behind the 7 extensive consultation we have done with employers, and 8 we are doing this with the private sector now as well as 9 the National Health Service to make it as clear and 10 explicit as possible that the expectation of doctors 11 whom they may employ is that of the standards of good 12 medical practice, the broad standards of good medical 13 practice, and that default from these in any or some 14 respects, if they cannot handle it themselves, ought, 15 automatically, to be a trigger to the GMC. 16 I cannot understate the importance of this. Huge 17 numbers of Chairmen and Chief Executives have been quite 18 unaware of that, and I still find that today. Hence our 19 engagement in this kind of proactive attempt to make 20 sure that this basis of professional practice is 21 understood by employers as well as doctors. 22 Q. So was it one of the problems in bringing the bad doctor 23 to book that the non-medical management did not 24 necessarily know what to expect of a good doctor? 25 A. Yes. 0083 1 Q. That would be, would it, a consequence of the fact that 2 standards and expectations were implicit rather than 3 explicit? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So that if you were a doctor, you knew what was expected 6 of a doctor, but if you were not, you did not? 7 A. I think that applies to both doctors -- inherent in 8 implicit standards, that there is a commonality of view 9 which we know is not always achievable with implicit 10 standards. It is only when you make things explicit, 11 there are no grounds for argument about what we are 12 talking about, that the matter becomes absolutely clear. 13 That is why we made the duties of a doctor 14 explicit, not leaving it implicit so that in doctors' 15 minds there was no room for doubt about what the GMC 16 meant. That is why we are saying to employers now, 17 equally, "There should be no doubt in your mind about 18 those people whom you employ. These, as far as we the 19 licensing body are concerned, are the particular 20 standards that we expect. Your job is to monitor this. 21 You are the people who are employing the doctor, we are 22 not, and it is not part of our statutory duty to do that 23 monitoring". We are increasingly making that explicit 24 and looking for evidence that there are arrangements 25 there in place for that appropriate monitoring. Of 0084 1 course, as we are finding, the government through the 2 Health Service are looking in exactly the same way for 3